Abstract. Bit-precise software verification is an important and difficult problem. While there has been an amazing progress in SAT solving, Satisfiability Modulo Theory of Bit Vectors, and bit-precise Bounded Model Checking, proving bit-precise safety, i.e. synthesizing a safe inductive invariant, remains a challenge. Although the problem is decidable and is reducible to propositional safety by bit-blasting, the approach does not scale in practice. The alternative approach of lifting propositional algorithms to bit-vectors is difficult. In this paper, we propose a novel technique that uses unsound approximations (i.e., neither over-nor under-) for synthesizing sound bit-precise invariants. We prototyped the technique using Z3/PDR engine and applied it to bit-precise verification of benchmarks from SVCOMP'13. Even with our preliminary implementation we were able to demonstrate significant (orders of magnitude) performance improvements with respect to bit-precise verificaton using Z3/PDR directy.
Introduction
The problem of program safety (or reachability) verification is to decide whether a given program can violate an assertion (i.e., can reach a bad state). The problem is reducible to finding either a finite counter-example, or a safe inductive invariant that certifies unreachability of a bad state. The problem of bit-precise program safety, Safety(BV), further requires that the program operations are represented soundly relative to low-level bit representation of data. Arguably, verification techniques that are not bit-precise are unsound, and do not reflect the actual behavior of a program. Unlike many other problems in software verification, bit-precise verification (without memory allocation and concurrency) is decidable. However, in practice it appears to be more challenging that verification of programs relative to integers or rationals (both undecidable).
The recent decade has seen an amazing progress in SAT solvers, in Satisfiability Modulo Theory of Bit-Vectors, SMT(BV), and in Bounded Model Checkers (BMC) based on these techniques. A SAT solver decides whether a given propositional formula is satisfiable. Current solvers can handle very large problems unsound in the presence of overflows (see [19] for an example), but the results are often "almost" correct. More importantly, they are useful to the users. Thus, we are interested in how to reuse such unsound invariants in a sound way.
Our procedure is based on an iterative guess-and-check loop. Given a Safety(BV) problem P , we begin by trying to solve P using a Safety(BV) solver. If this takes too long, we abort it, and construct an approximation (neither over-nor under-) P T of P in another theory T (e.g., Linear Rational Arithmetic), decide the safety of P T using a solver for Safety(T ), and obtain an inductive safe invariant Inv T . We then port Inv T in a sound way to P , strengthen P with it, and repeat bitblasting-based verification. In the best case, the ported version of Inv T is a safe and inductive invariant for P and the process terminates immediately. In the worst case, Inv T contributes facts that might help the next verification effort.
We make the following contributions. First, we formally define a framework that allows to use unsound invariants soundly in a verification loop. Second, we instantiate the framework for the theories of Bit Vectors and Linear Arithmetic. In particular, we describe an algorithm for computing Maximal Inductive Subformula for SMT(BV) and show how it interacts with the pre-processing step. Third, we have implemented the proposed framework using Z3/PDR for Safety(Prop) and Boolector for SMT(BV) and have evaluated it on the benchmarks from SVCOMP'13. Even with our preliminary implementation, we are able to synthesize safe invariants for most programs.
Related work. The use of over-and under-approximation and relaxation of a problem from one theory into another is common in both SMT-solving and Model Checking. For example, Bryant et al. [7] , use over-and under-approximation to decide formulas in SMT(BV). Komuravelli et al. [24] similarly use over-and under-approximations for Software Model Checking. While we do not require our approximations to be sound, we employ similar techniques to lift proof certificates (inductive invariants in our case) are in principle similar.
Computing Maximal Inductive Subformula (MIS) is similar to mining an inductive invariant from a set of possible annotations, as for example in [16, 23] . The key novelty in our approach is in the reduction from MIS problem to a Minimal Unsatisfiable Subformula (MUS) problem that allows the use of efficient MUS extractors for SAT.
The works conceptually closest to ours are in the area of Upgrade Checking [15] , Multi-Property Verification [8] , and Regression Verification [18, 28, 4] . A common theme in the above approaches is that they attempt to lift a safety invariant from one given program P 1 to another, related but not equivalent, program P 2 . The key difference is that we do not assume existence of a proven program P 1 , but, instead, synthesize P 1 and its safety proof automatically.
Preliminaries
We assume some familiarity with program verification, logic, SMT and SAT.
Safety verification. A transition system P is a tuple (V, Init, Tr , Bad ), where V is a set of variables, Init, Bad , and Tr are formulas (with free variables in V) denoting the initial and the bad states, and the transition relation, respectively.
A transition system P is UNSAFE iff there exists a natural number N such that the following formula is satisfiable:
When P is UNSAFE and s ∈ Bad is the reachable state, the path from s 0 ∈ Init to s ∈ Bad is called a counterexample (CEX). A transition system P is SAFE if and only if there exists a formula Inv , called a safe invariant, that satisfies the following conditions:
A formula Inv that satisfies the first two conditions is called an invariant of P , while a formula Inv that satisfies the third condition is called safe. A safety verification problem is to decide whether a transition system P is SAFE or UNSAFE. Thus, a safety verification problem is equivalent to the problem of establishing an existence of a safe invariant. In SAT-based Model Checking, the verification problem is decided by iteratively synthesizing an invariant Inv or finding a CEX.
Minimal Unsatisfiability. A CNF formula F , viewed as a set of clauses, is minimal unsatisfiable (MU) if (i) F is unsatisfiable, and (ii) for any clause C ∈ F , F \ {C} is satisfiable. A CNF formula F is a minimal unsatisfiable subformula (MUS) of a formula F if F ⊆ F and F is MU. Motivated by several applications, minimal unsatisfiability and related concepts have been extended to CNF formulas where clauses are partitioned into disjoint sets called groups.
Definition 1.
[33] Given an explicitly partitioned unsatisfiable CNF formula
Notice that group-0, G 0 , plays the special role of a "background" subformula, with respect to which the set of groups {G 1 , . . . , G k } is minimized. In particular, if G 0 is unsatisfiable, the group-MUS of G is ∅.
3 Synthesizing Safe Bit-Precise Invariants
High-level description of the approach
Given a transition system P = (V, Init, Tr , Bad ), let the target theory T T be the theory 1 , or a combination of theories, that define the formulas in P . Let T W be another theory, referred to as a working theory, with the intention that reasoning in T W is easier in practice than reasoning in T T . Our approach relies on a mapping M T →W that translates formulas over T T to formulas over T W . Although the correctness of the approach is not affected by the choice of M T →W , its effectiveness is. We would like to map between formulas that are somewhat close to each other semantically. Thus, we assume that M T →W maps the terms and the atomic formulas of T T to those of T W and is an identity mapping for the symbols shared between the two theories. The mapping is extended to all formulas of T T by structural induction, i.e., given a formula F (v) over T T , the corresponding formula F W (v) over T W is constructed by inductively applying M T →W on the structure of F (v). Similarly, to translate formulas from T W to T T , we work with a mapping M W →T from the terms and the atomic formulas of the working theory T W to those of T T , extended to all formulas of T W .
Example 1. Let T T = BV * (32) -a sub-theory of the quantifier-free fragment of the first-order theory of 32 bit bit-vector arithmetic (cf., [7] ) obtained by removing all the non-arithmetic functions and predicates, as well as the multiplication and the division on bit-vectors. Let T W = LA -the quantifier-free fragment of the first order-theory of linear arithmetic, together with the propositional logic. The mapping M T →W is defined as follows: (i) the propositional fragment of T T maps to the propositional fragment of T W as is; (ii) bit-vector variables map to LA variables; (iii) the arithmetic functions and predicates of BV(32) map to their natural counterparts in LA, e.g., + [32] to +, < [32] to <, etc. Then, if
Init(x [32] , y [32] , z) = (x [32] + [32] y [32] > [32] 0 [32] ) ∧ z, where x [32] and y [32] are bit-vector and z propositional variables, the corresponding LA formula Init W (x, y, z) is
The inverse mapping M W →T from LA to BV(32) is constructed in a similar manner, with the slight complication related to LA constants, which might be non-integer, too large to fit into the required bit-width, or negative. One possibility to deal with non-integer constants is to truncate the fractional digits, i.e., map 0.5 to 0 [32] . Other options include rounding up the constants when possible, e.g., by translating (x > 0.5) to (x [32] ≥ [32] 1 [32] ), but (x < 0.5) to (x [32] ≤ [32] 0 [32] ). For this paper, we adopt the former, simpler, approach, and leave the investigation of more sophisticated translations to future work. To convert an integer LA constant to BV(32) we take the lower 32 bit of its 2s-complement representation. Remark 1. Clearly, our sub-theory BV * (32) of the full theory BV(32) was chosen to simplify the construction of the mapping to and from LA. Generally, such restriction of the original target theory might not be necessary if the working theory T W supports uninterpreted functions.
The pseudocode in Algorithm 1 provides the high-level description of our verification framework (MISper). Given a transition system P = (V, Init, Tr , Bad ) Algorithm 1: MISper -safety verification framework 
over the target theory T T (e.g., BV * (32) from Example 1), we first attempt to solve P with a solver for Safety(T T ) under heuristically chosen resource limits 2 . If the solver fails to prove or disprove the safety of P , we pick a working theory T W , and a pair of corresponding mappings M T →W and M W →T (e.g., T W = LA and the mappings are as in Example 1). Then, we attempt to verify the safety of
, where U are the fresh variables introduced by M T →W , using a solver for Safety(T W ). Since P W is in general neither under-nor over-approximation of P , the (un)safety of the former does not imply the (un)safety of the latter. Since the focus of this paper is on synthesis of invariants for verification, we omit the detailed discussion of how to handle the UNSAFE status of P W . One option is to simply return UNKNOWN, as in Algorithm 1. Alternatively, the CEX for P W can be mapped to T T via M W →T and checked on P -if the mapped CEX is also a CEX for P , return UNSAFE. Otherwise, the mapping can be refined to eliminate the CEX, and the safety verification of P W under the new mapping repeated. If, on the other hand, P W is safe, we take the safe invariant Inv W of P W , and translate it back to the target theory T T to obtain a candidate-invariant formula Cand = M W →T (Inv W ). If Cand is a safe invariant of P , then the safety of P is established, and the algorithm returns SAFE. Otherwise, we attempt to compute a subformula Cand I of Cand that is an invariant of P -this is done in the function ComputeMIS on line 13 of Algorithm 1, which we describe in detail in Section 3.2. Once an invariant of P is obtained, we restrict the transition relation of P by replacing the formula Tr (u, v) in P with the formula Cand I (u) ∧ Tr (u, v) ∧ Cand I (v), and attempt to verify the safety of the new transition system (the next iteration of the main loop). Since Cand I is the actual invariant of P , the (un)safety of strengthened transition system implies the (un)safety of the input system P .
This verification framework can be instantiated in numerous ways and leaves a number of open heuristic choices. We postpone the description of an instantiation of the framework used in our experiments to Section 4.
Computing invariants
We refer to the conjuncts L i of Cand as lemmas. Then, the invariant Cand I can be always be constructed as a (possibly empty) conjunction of some of the lemmas in Cand . In our setting, this assumption is justified by the fact that many verification tools, particularly those based on PDR [5, 13] and its extensions (e.g., Z3/PDR [22] ) do indeed produce invariants in this form. In the worst case, Cand itself can be treated as the (only) conjunct, which, while affecting the effectiveness of our approach, does not affect its correctness. We note that the ideas discussed in this section can be extended to candidate invariants of arbitrary structure, though such extension is outside of the scope of this paper.
For notational convenience we treat Cand as a set of lemmas {L 1 , . . . , L n }, and formalize the invariant computation problem as follows:
Definition 2. Given a set of lemmas L = {L 1 , . . . , L n } and a transition relation
It is not difficult to see that a union of two inductive subsets is inductive, and so any set of lemmas L has a unique maximal, and hence a unique maximum, inductive subset L . We refer to L as the MIS (maximal/maximum inductive subset) of L. Thus, in our framework, given a candidate invariant Cand of transition system P , the actual invariant Cand I of P is obtained by computing the MIS of Cand -this is motivated by the fact that we aim to strengthen the transition relation as much as possible prior to the next iteration of the algorithm.
Approaches to MIS computation. The existing approaches to computation of MISes can be categorized into eager and lazy. Given a set of lemmas L = {L 1 , . . . , L n } and the transition relation Tr , the eager approach (taken, for example, in [8] ) starts by checking whether L(u) ∧ Tr (u, v) |= L(v). This is typically done by testing the unsatisfiability of the formula L(u) ∧ Tr (u, v) ∧ ¬L(v) with an SMT (or a SAT) solver. If the formula satisfiable, i.e., L is not inductive, the model returned by the solver must falsify one or more lemmas in L(v). These lemmas are then removed both from L(u) and from L(v), and the test is repeated.
The final subset L is obviously inductive. Furthermore, for any set of lemmas L ⊆ L \ L there must have been a point in the execution of the algorithm where it obtained a model for a formula L (u) ∧ L (u) ∧ Tr (u, v) that falsifies at least one lemma in L (v), as otherwise this lemma would be included in L . Hence, L is maximal, and therefore is a MIS of L.
In the lazy approach to MIS computation (e.g., [16, 24] ), when the set L is not inductive, the lemmas in the consequent L(v) that are falsified by the model of L(u) ∧ Tr (u, v) are initially removed only from L(v). The process continues until for some L ⊆ L, L(u) ∧ Tr (u, v) |= L (v) -notice that the premise still contains all of the lemmas of L. We refer to such sets L as semi-inductive with respect to L and Tr . Observe that the semi-inductive subset L obtained in this manner is maximal and also maximum, by the argument analogous to that used to establish the uniqueness of MISes. Once the maximum semi-inductive subset L of L is computed, the lemmas excluded from L are removed from L(u), and the algorithm checks whether L (u) ∧ Tr (u, v) |= L (v), i.e., whether L is inductive. If not, the algorithm repeats the process, by first computing a maximum semi-inductive subset of L , then checking its inductiveness, and so on. The, eventually obtained, inductive subset of L is the MIS of L -this can be justified in essentially the same way as for the eager approach.
One potential advantage of the lazy approach is that, since, compared to the eager approach, there are often more lemmas in the premises, the SMT/SAT solver is likely to work with stronger formulas. Furthermore, if a solver retains information between invocations -for example, derived facts and history-based heuristic parameters, as in incremental SAT solvers -more information can be reused between iterations, thus speeding-up the MIS computation.
One additional feature of the lazy approach, pointed out and used in [24] , is that the computation of semi-inductive subsets can be reduced to the computation of Minimal Unsatisfiable Subformulas (MUSes), or, more precisely, to the computation of group-MUSes (recall Definition 1). This observation is particularly useful in cases when satisfiability problem in the theory that defines the invariants can be soundly reduced to propositional satisfiability, as it allows to leverage the large body of recent work and tools for the computation of MUSes (e.g., [2, 30, 34] ). We take advantage of this observation in the implementation of our framework since, in our case, the invariants are quantifier-free formula over (a sub-theory of) the theory of bit-vectors, and the satisfiability of such formulas can be soundly reduced to SAT via bit-blasting. The reduction to group-MUS computation and the overall MIS extraction flow are presented below.
Computing MISes with group-MUSes. For a set of lemmas L = {L 1 , . . . , L n } and a transition relation formula Tr , we first rewrite the formula L(u)∧Tr (u, v)∧ ¬L(v), used to check the inductiveness of L, as a formula A L,Tr defined in the following way:
where pre i and post i for i ∈ [1, n] are fresh propositional variables, one for each lemma L i ∈ L. One of the purposes of these variables is similar to that of the indicator variables used in assumption-based incremental SAT solving (cf. [14] ) -the variables can be used to emulate the removal of lemmas from formulas L(u) and L(v). Setting pre i to true (resp. false) causes the lemma L i to be included (resp. excluded) from L(u), while setting post i to true (resp. false) has the same effect on the lemma L i in L(v). The names of the variables reflect the fact that they control either the "precondition" or the "postcondition" lemmas. With this in mind, a computation of the MIS of L with respect to Tr can be implemented on top of an incremental SMT solver by loading the formula A L,Tr into the solver, and checking the satisfiability of the formula under a set of assumptions. For example, the set L is inductive if and only if the formula is unsatisfiable under assumptions i∈ [1,n] {pre i , post i }. When a lemma L i ∈ L needs to be removed from L(u) and/or L(v), we simply assert the formula (¬pre i ) and/or (¬post i ) to the solver.
However, as explained above, our intention is to take advantage of propositional MUS extractors, using the fact that quantifier-free bit-vector formulas can be soundly converted to propositional logic. The pre and post variables serve a purpose in this context as well. Assume that we have a polytime computable function B2P , which given a quantifier-free formula F BV over the theory BV, and a set of propositional variables X = {x 1 , . . . , x k } that occur in F BV returns a propositional formula F P rop = B2P (F BV , X), in CNF, with the following property: for any assignment τ to the variables in X, the formula F BV [τ ] is satisfiable if and only if so is the formula F P rop [τ ] . Following [29] , we say that the formulas F BV and F P rop are var-equivalent on X in this case. Note that var-equivalence of F BV and F P rop on X does not imply F P rop contains all variables of X -for example, F P rop = is var-equivalent to F BV if F BV [τ ] is satisfiable for every assignment τ for X.
Now, for a set of lemmas L = {L 1 , . . . , L n } and a transition relation Tr over BV, let A L,Tr be the formula defined in (3), let
Consider the group-CNF formula G L,Tr constructed in the following way:
That is, the group G 0 of G L,Tr is the formula C L,Tr -a CNF formula varequivalent to A L,Tr on the set Pre ∪ Post -together with the positive unit clauses for pre variables. Each group G i in G L,Tr consists of a single negative unit clause for the variable post i . Proposition 1. Let G be a group-MUS of the group-CNF formula G L,Tr . Then, the set of lemmas L = {L k | k ∈ [1, n] and G k / ∈ G} is the maximum semiinductive subset of L with respect to Tr . Furthermore, G = ∅ iff L is inductive.
Intuitively, Proposition 1 follows from the fact that the function B2P preserves var-equivalence. The formulas A L,Tr and C L,Tr are var-equivalent on the variables Pre ∪ Post. Thus, any group-MUS G of the group-CNF formula G L,Tr is exactly a group-MUS of the "group-BV" formula obtained by taking A L,Tr together with the appropriate unit clauses as group-0 and the rest of groups as in G L,Tr . Furthermore, whenever a group G i is included in G, the corresponding variable post i is forced to 0, and so the lemma L i (v) is disabled in A L,Tr . Since G 0 ∪ G is unsatisfiable, so is the formula A L,Tr with the rest of the post-lemmas (i.e., the set L ) enabled, thus implying the semi-inductiveness of L . The maximality of the latter is implied by the minimality of G.
Proof. First, observe that the formula G L,Tr is unsatisfiable. This is because Let
where L is as defined in the statement of the proposition. Hence, L is semiinductive.
Finally, w.l.o.g. take any G ⊂ G. Since G is a group-MUS of G L,Tr , the formula G 0 ∪ G is satisfiable. Following the previous argument with the assignment τ G we have that the formula A L,Tr [τ G ] is satisfiable, and so is the formula
We conclude that any L ⊃ L is not semi-inductive, and so L is maximal.
The "only-if" part of the second claim of the proposition follows immediately from the first claim. For the "if" part, assume that L is inductive, and let τ be the assignment that enables all lemmas of L, i.e., τ = {pre i → 1, The MIS computation algorithm. Based on Proposition 1, we can compute the maximum semi-inductive subset of the set of lemmas L by invoking any off-the-shelf group-MUS extractor (e.g., MUSer2 [3] ). The post variables are essential for this reduction, as the translation function B2P can, and in practice does, significantly modify the structure of the input BV formula through the application of various BV-specific preprocessing techniques. The purpose of pre 
// the group-CNF defined in eq. (4)
variables is slightly more technical. Assume that in the first iteration of the lazy MIS computation algorithm a maximal semi-inductive set L of L is computed, and that L ⊂ L. At this point, some of the lemmas L(u) (i.e., the precondition lemmas) have to be removed from L. One possibility is to build a new formula A L ,Tr analogously to that in equation (3), apply the function B2P to it, and proceed with the computation of the maximum semi-inductive subset of L . An alternative is to re-use the CNF formula C L,Tr , obtained by translating the original formula A L,Tr via B2P , and simply add negative unit clauses (¬pre i ) and (¬post i ) for each of the lemmas removed from L. This way we avoid reinvoking B2P , and open up the possibility of reusing more information between the invocations of the group-MUS extractor. As the group-CNF formula G L,Tr does need to be modified between iterations by taking into account removal of some of the lemmas, for a set L ⊆ L of remaining lemmas we define the group-CNF formula G L,L ,Tr as follows:
The pseudocode of the MIS computation algorithm based on the ideas presented above is presented in Algorithm 2. Given a set of BV lemmas L and a transition relation formula Tr , the algorithm constructs the formula A L,Tr , defined in (3), and converts the formula to CNF using a var-equivalence preserving function B2P . The set L that will eventually represent the resulting MIS is initialized to L. The main loop of the algorithm reflects the outer loop of the lazy MIS computation approach. On every iteration, the maximum semi-inductive subset of L is computed via the reduction to group-MUS computation, as justified by Proposition 1. If the group-MUS is empty, then, according to Proposition 1, the set L itself is inductive, and, therefore, based on the correctness of the lazy MIS computation algorithm, is the MIS of L. Otherwise, L is updated to the computed maximum semi-inductive subset represented by the extracted A number of interesting additional observations can be made by analyzing the data in Table 1 . Consider the 58 instances unsolved by Z3/PDR and solved by MISper in the 32-bit experiments (second row of Table 1 ). In 52 of these the safe invariants obtained in LA were transferred to directly to BV. Thus, in many practical cases, while the safety of the program can be easily established without taking into account its bit-precise semantics, the BV-based engine seems to get bogged down by discovering information that, in the end, is mostly irrelevant. In these situations, our approach allows to "find needles in the haystack", and quickly. In the remaining 6 cases, the bit-precise semantics do come into play. However, the MIS-based invariant synthesis allows to transfer information that is useful for bit-precise reasoning -this is evidenced by at least 3x average speed-up of bit-precise reasoning on the strengthened system, with close to 6x speed-up on 3 instances out of 6. The 16-bit experiments confirm the usefulness of the partially transferred invariants further: out of 18 instances unsolved by Z3/PDR, only on 6 the LA invariant could be transferred directly to BV, while on remaining 12 the partial information allowed to speed-up the verification by at least 2x on average.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a bit-precise program verification framework MISper. The key idea behind the framework is to transfer, at least partially, information obtained during the verification of an unsound approximation of the original program in the form of bit-precise invariants. We describe a novel approach to computing such invariants that allows to take advantage of the state-of-the-art propositional MUS extractors. The results of the experiments with our prototype implementation of the framework suggest that the proposed approach is promising. Furthermore, the verification tool FrankenBit [20] that integrates our prototype implementation of MISper with LLBMC [32] , has won two awards at the 2014 Competition on Software Verification (SVCOMP '14) .
